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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Asked to identify prominent Supreme Court decisions dealing with slavery, most 
educated Americans would immediately cite Dred Scott v. Sandford.1  Those who are 
more familiar with the Court’s role in the sectional conflict might also remember 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania2 and United States v. The Amistad.3  However, I suspect that 
only a few specialists would think of Ableman v. Booth.4  Indeed, even those 
Constitutional Law textbooks that deal extensively with the law of slavery make at 
most passing references to the case.5  Thus, those law students and legal 
professionals who do have some familiarity with Ableman would typically associate 
the case with the law of federal jurisdiction—the precursor to Tarble’s Case.6 
In fact, however, in Ableman the Court became involved in one of the most 
dramatic confrontations in the long-running dispute over fugitive slaves.  Widely-
discussed at the time, the case involved not only a successful effort by a segment of 
the Northern populace to prevent the rendition of an escaped slave, but also the 
outright defiance of the federal government by the judiciary of the state of 
Wisconsin.  Moreover, unlike Dred Scott, the doctrinal framework that underlay 
Ableman remains firmly established should be “entrenched” today. 
The Article will discuss and analyze the forces that shaped Ableman, the 
                                                                
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University (Camden). 
160 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
340 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). 
462 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
5For example, PAUL BREST, ET. AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 229, 217, 213 (5th ed. 2006), features three slavery-related decisions 
as principal cases: Dred Scott, Prigg, and Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).  
Ableman, by contrast, is relegated to a brief discussion in a note. Id. at 227. In GEOFFREY R. 
STONE, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-453 (5th ed. 2005), Dred Scott and State v. Post, 
20 N.J.L. 368 (1845), are principal cases, and Prigg is discussed in one short note.  Ableman is 
not mentioned. 
680 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872). 
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Supreme Court’s disposition of the case, and the aftermath of the decision.  The 
Article will begin by describing the state of the dispute over fugitive slaves in the 
mid-1850s.  The Article will then recount the events that brought Ableman to the 
Supreme Court and analyze the Court’s opinion.  Finally, the Article will discuss the 
aftermath and significance of the dispute. 
II.  THE DISPUTE OVER FUGITIVE SLAVES 
While it was by no means a novel concept, the Fugitive Slave Clause7 was the 
most unambiguously pro-slavery provision to emerge from the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.  To be sure, many commentators have argued that a number of 
other sections of the Constitution favored Southern interests.8  However, the Fugitive 
Slave Clause was the only provision that explicitly granted slaveowners rights that 
they had not heretofore possessed.  Under the Articles of Confederation, each state 
could, if it wished, free any putative slave found within its borders.  By contrast, the 
new Constitution both forbade states from declaring escaped slaves free, and 
guaranteed slaveowners the right to recover runaways. 
Despite its clear pro-slavery orientation, at the time that it was adopted, the 
Fugitive Slave Clause was almost entirely uncontroversial.  On August 28, 1787, 
after the Convention had committed itself to a provision requiring states to extradite 
fugitives from justice, Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved 
to require “fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.”9  James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania observed that “[t]his would [require] the Executive of the 
State to do it, at public expence,”10 and Roger Sherman of Connecticut complained 
that he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or a 
servant, than a horse.”11  Butler then withdrew his motion “in order that some 
particular provision might be made apart from [the Extradition Clause].”12  On 
August 29, his motion to insert a separate clause was adopted without objection,13 
and on September 12, the Committee of Style and Arrangement produced language 
that was essentially identical to that which is currently in the Constitution.14  After a 
minor change in wording on September 15,15 the Fugitive Slave Clause became part 
                                                                
7U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
8E.g., Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant 
with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 188-255 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987); William M., Wiecek, The 
Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution’s Origins, in THE FRAMING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-84 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 
1987). 





13Id. at 453-54. 
14Id at 577. 
15Id. at 628 (“‘legally’ was struck out, and ‘under the laws thereof’ inserted”). 
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of the Convention’s proposal without apparent dissent. 
This new protection for slaveholders was not a major point of contention in the 
struggle over ratification though some Southern federalists did point to the Clause as 
a benefit to the South.16  However, the reaction of Northern antifederalists stands in 
marked contrast to their treatment of other provisions of the new Constitution that 
they viewed as pro-slavery.  While Northern opponents of the Constitution 
vociferously attacked both the apportionment of the House of Representatives and 
the Slave Trade Clause, their reaction to the Fugitive Slave Clause was a resounding 
silence. 
In 1793, after considerable debate, Congress passed a statute designed to 
implement the constitutional guarantee.17  The new federal statute allowed a slave 
owner or his agent to seize an alleged fugitive and bring him before either a federal 
judge or local magistrate.18  Upon "proof [of ownership] to the satisfaction" of that 
official, which could be provided either by affidavit or oral testimony, a certificate 
would issue that allowed the removal of the alleged slave to the state from which he 
was purported to have fled.19  The statute also provided that anyone who knowingly 
and willingly obstructed a claimant in his effort to recover a slave would be subject 
to a $500 penalty, payable to the claimant.20 
The statute left a number of issues in doubt.  For example, it was unclear whether 
the owner retained the common law right of "recaption"—the right to reclaim an 
escaped slave by self-help and to return the slave to service without the benefit of 
government intervention or sanction.  Moreover, the statute did not address the 
constitutional status of anti-kidnapping or personal liberty laws—state statutes that 
imposed additional procedural requirements on those Southerners who sought to 
remove alleged fugitives from free states. Finally, the constitutionality of parts of the 
federal law itself remained in doubt for much of the early nineteenth century, as anti-
slavery theorists not only claimed that alleged fugitives were constitutionally entitled 
to jury trials, but also at times denied that Congress possessed any authority to 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.21 
                                                                
16Kenneth Morgan, Slavery and the Debate over Ratification of the United States 
Constitution, 22 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 40, 53 (2001). 
17The background and evolution of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 are described in detail 
in Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law 
of 1793, 56 J.S. HIST. 397 (1990)(hereinafter Finkelman, Kidnapping); William R. Leslie, A 
Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver Creek Murders, 57 AM. HIST. 
REV. 63 (1951). 
18Finkelman, Kidnapping, supra note 17, at 419. 
19Id. at 420. 
20Id.  
21See, e.g., SALMON P. CHASE, SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE, IN THE CASE OF THE 
COLORED WOMAN, MATILDA, WHO WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF 
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO, BY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: MARCH 11, 1837, at 8-9 (Cincinnati, 
Pugh & Dodd 1837), available at http://dlxs.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=mayantislavery;idno=07838206;view=image;seq=1 (view each page of the manuscript 
by selecting individual pages in the “go to page” dropdown menu). 
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In 1842, the Supreme Court confronted these issues in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.22  
Prigg was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Anti-kidnapping 
Law.  Speaking through Justice Joseph Story, a deeply divided Court concluded that 
the right of recaption was guaranteed by the Fugitive Slave Clause; that, 
notwithstanding the lack of an explicit grant of enforcement authority, Congress 
possessed the exclusive power to pass legislation implementing the clause, and that 
state personal liberty laws were therefore unconstitutional; that alleged fugitives 
were entitled to no greater procedural protections than those established by the 1793 
statute; but that state officials could not be compelled to participate in the 
enforcement of the federal statute.23 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Prigg did not still the ongoing disputes over 
efforts by Southerners to recover alleged fugitive slaves.  The decision does not seem 
to have caused a great stir among the general public.  For example, in 1843, the 
North American Review asserted that there was “hardly a whisper against the fidelity 
and even-handed justice” of  the Court’s holding and that the ruling was “received by 
the public with the quiet submission which they usually manifest when ordinary 
judicial decisions are announced.”24  Those comments that were made immediately 
after the decision split largely on sectional lines.  For example, the New York Daily 
Express complained that “the conclusion to which the Court have arrived involves 
consequences which can by no means be satisfactory to this part of the country,”25  
and  the abolitionist Cincinnati Philanthropist described the decision as “revolting” 
and condemned what the newspaper characterized as an assault on state 
sovereignty.26 Conversely, without examining Story’s opinion, the Baltimore Sun 
declared that Prigg was “all that Maryland can desire, and will be particularly 
agreeable to the slaveholders of the South.”27 
In some respects, these reactions were entirely understandable.  On the specific 
                                                                
2241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
23Id. Prigg has been the subject of a large body of scholarly comment.  Among the more 
notable treatments are: THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF 
THE NORTH 1780-1861, at 94-105 (1974); Christopher L. M. Eisgruber, Comment, Justice 
Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 273 (1988); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Understanding Justice Story’s 
Proslavery Nationalism, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 51 (1997)(hereinafter Finkelman, Prigg); Paul 
Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph 
Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994)(hereinafter Finkelman, Story); 
Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS. L.J. 605 (1993)(hereinafter 
Finkelman, Sorting); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Joseph 
Story, Slavery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086 (1993); Earl M. Maltz, 
Majority, Concurrence, and Dissent: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Structure of Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 345 (2000). 
245 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 543 (1974) (quoting The Independence of the Judiciary, 57 N. AM. 
REV. 400, 419 (1843)). 
252 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1936-1918, at 
86, (rev. ed. 1987) (quoting NEW YORK DAILY EXPRESS, Mar. 8, 1842). 
26SWISHER, supra note 24, at 544 (quoting CINCINNATI PHILANTHROPIST, Mar. 30, 1842). 
27Id. at 543 (quoting BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 3, 1842). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/5
2008] SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION 87 
 
issue presented by Prigg on its facts—the question of whether the Pennsylvania anti-
kidnapping law was unconstitutional—the South had indeed won a complete victory.  
However, Southerners soon became disenchanted with the regime that the Court had 
established.  In 1843, taking advantage of one of the implicit suggestions in Justice 
Story's opinion the states of Massachusetts, Vermont and Ohio passed laws that 
prohibited state officials from participating in the process of returning fugitive 
slaves, and also forbade the use of state jails in the process.  Pennsylvania followed 
suit in 1847, and Rhode Island in 1848.28  The passage of these statutes led one 
Southern commentator to complain that “[n]o decision of the Supreme Court of the 
Union has produced more evil consequences than [Prigg].  It has embarrassed the 
owners of slaves in recovering their property in the free States.  It has encouraged the 
abolitionists in their efforts to increase those embarrassments.”29  
At times, anti-slavery Northerners went even further, mobilizing direct resistance 
to efforts by slaveowners to reclaim fugitives.  The so-called McClintock Riot of 
1847 was particularly well-publicized.  In that case, James Kennedy, a Maryland 
slave owner, was killed when a group of Carlisle, Pennsylania residents tried to 
prevent him and a companion from returning to Maryland with three fugitives who 
had escaped to Carlisle.30 
Slaveholders viewed such incidents as evidence of Northern disdain for their 
constitutional obligations.  For example, a Virginia state legislative committee 
characterized the new round of personal liberty laws as a “disgusting and revolting 
exhibition of faithless and unconstitutional legislation” and as “palpable frauds upon 
the South, calculated to excite at once her indignation and her contempt.”31   
Similarly, in his Southern Address, John C. Calhoun declared that, as a result of the 
actions of the Northern states “the [Fugitive Slave Clause] is now defunct, except 
perhaps in [Indiana and Illinois]” and that “the evasion by which it has been set aside 
may fairly be regarded as one of the most fatal blows ever received by the South and 
the Union.”32  
Against this background, Southerners insisted that Congress pass a strengthened 
fugitive slave law as part of the Compromise of 1850.  The Fugitive Slave Act of 
185033 greatly expanded the number of federal officials empowered to act as 
commissioners for the purpose of issuing certificates of removal and charged these 
officials with the duty of hearing claims of putative masters "in a summary 
                                                                
28The response of Northern state legislatures to Prigg is described in greater detail in 
MORRIS, supra note 23, at 107-29. 
29The Slavery Question, or the Rights and the Union of the States, AM. L.J. 9, 10 (April 
1850). 
30This incident is described in detail in, The McClintock Riots (June 2,1847), 
http://chronicles.dickinson.edu/encyclo/m/ed_mcClintockriot.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
31Quoted in STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 14 (1968)(citation omitted).  
326 RICHARD K. CRALLE, THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 290-313 (1851), available at 
http://facweb.furman.edu/~benson/docs/calhoun.htm. 
33For accounts of the complex legislative history of the statute, see CAMPBELL, supra note 
31, at 15-25; 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 
1776-1854, at 500-08 (1990); MORRIS, supra note 23, at 130-47. 
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manner."34  Upon receiving "satisfactory proof" of the validity of the claimant's 
assertion of ownership—defined as either a sworn statement taken by the responsible 
official himself or a document certifying that appropriate testimony had been given 
before an official in the state from which the alleged escape had occurred—the 
federal commissioner was to issue a certificate for removal of the alleged fugitive.35  
The testimony of the alleged runaway himself was explicitly deemed inadmissible.36  
The commissioner was to be paid ten dollars per case if he found for the claimant, 
but five dollars if he found against the claimant.37 
Once a certificate of removal was issued, no court was allowed to interfere with 
the removal of the alleged fugitive.38  The claimant was entitled to enlist the aid of 
federal marshals in securing and returning the alleged fugitive to his home state, and 
the marshals were to be liable for the full value of any fugitive who escaped.39  
Moreover, the commissioners were empowered to summon ordinary citizens to act 
as a posse comitatus to apprehend the alleged fugitive.40  Finally, the statute 
increased the penalties for those who interfered with the apprehension of alleged 
fugitives.41 
Many Southerners saw passage of the new Fugitive Slave law as the most 
significant concession to the South in the Compromise of 1850.  Indeed, in the 
Georgia Platform of 1851, a state convention specifically declared that “[i]t is the 
deliberate opinion of this Convention that upon a faithful execution of the Fugitive 
Slave Law . . . depends the preservation of our much beloved Union.”42  By contrast, 
anti-slavery Northerners were outraged by the statute—particularly by its specific 
rejection of the use of the writ of habeas corpus and its failure to provide for a jury 
trial, even after the alleged fugitive had been returned to the home state of the 
claimant.43  To be sure, early in the 1850s most fugitive slaves were recovered under 
the procedures established by the statute without incident.44  Nonetheless, Northern 
resentment was at times reflected in efforts to free alleged fugitives held pursuant to 
the statute, even when the validity of the master's claim was clear.   For example, in 
1851 mobs facilitated the escape of Shadrach Minkins in Boston and William Henry, 
a fugitive slave held in a Syracuse, New York jail.45  An attempt by the Vermont 
                                                                






40Id. at 145. 
41Id. at 146. 
42DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 128 (1976)(citation omitted). 
43See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 23, at 163-65. 
44FREEHLING, supra note 33, at 536. 
45CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 154-57. 
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state legislature to nullify the statute further infuriated Southern  representatives.46  
Although on its face dealing only with the issue of slavery in the territories, the 
acrimonious dispute over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 further emboldened the 
critics of the Fugitive Slave Act in the North.  The passage of the statute permanently 
transformed the national political structure, leading to the dissolution of the Whig 
party and the formation of a broad-based coalition of former Whigs, Democrats and 
Free Soilers in the North, organized around opposition to slavery and the so-called 
“Slave Power,” which soon became known as the Republican party.47  The creation 
of this organization and the anti-Southern feeling that it embodied provided 
additional impetus for those who opposed enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.  
These events provided the backdrop for the dispute that ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth. 
III.  THE ROAD TO ABLEMAN V. BOOTH48 
The prelude to the consideration of Ableman began prosaically when a slave, 
Joshua Glover, escaped from Bennami S. Garland, his master in Missouri. Glover 
then came to live and work in Racine, Wisconsin in 1852.  On Friday, March 10, 
1854, after receiving the requisite authorization from United States District Judge 
Andrew G. Miller, Garland came to Glover's home in Racine and, with the aid of two 
Deputy United States Marshals and four assistants, captured Glover after a struggle 
and brought him to the county jail in Milwaukee. Glover was held in the jail pursuant 
to a Wisconsin statute that required county jails to provide facilities to detain persons 
held under federal law. 
On March 11, a large group of residents gathered in Racine to protest Glover’s 
capture.  A committee was chosen to draft resolutions.  Among other things, these 
resolutions condemned the “kidnapping” of Glover, demanded that he receive a trial 
by jury and, asserting that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had repealed “all compromises 
heretofore adopted by the Congress of the United States,” characterized the 
“Slavecatching law of 1850" as “disgraceful and also repealed.”  Copies of the 
resolutions were sent by telegraph to Sherman M. Booth, an abolitionist newspaper 
editor in Milwaukee.  After first printing a run of inflammatory handbills, Booth rode 
through the streets of Milwaukee shouting “a man’s liberty is at stake!” and also 
reportedly exhorting “freemen to the rescue!”   
By two-thirty p.m., a crowd of several thousand people had gathered outside the 
jail where Glover was being detained.  The crowd passed resolutions which, among 
                                                                
46See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 1950-53 (1851). 
47There is a vast literature dealing with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its 
impact on the structure of the American political system, particularly in the North.  For 
different perspectives, see, e.g.,  WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 
1852-1856 (1987); MICHAEL HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: 
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 804-834 (1999); POTTER, supra note 
42, ch. 7; and  SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 
671-704 (2005). 
48The account of the rescue of Joshua Glover is taken from ROBERT H. BAKER, THE 
RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE SLAVE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMING OF THE 
CIVIL WAR (2006); SWISHER, supra note 24, at 650-73; and A. J. Beitzinger, Federal Law 
Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 7 (1957). 
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other things, demanded that Glover receive a trial by jury.  A vigilance committee 
was also appointed.   In the interim, attorneys who had been contacted by Booth 
persuaded a local circuit judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus, demanding that 
those who held Glover in custody bring him before the judge and justify the decision 
to hold Glover.  The writ initially was served on Sheriff Herman Page, the county 
official who had charge of the jail.  Page, however, responded that while Glover was 
in the county jail, he was not in Page’s custody.  The attorneys then returned to the 
circuit judge and persuaded him to issue a second writ of habeas corpus, this time 
directed to Deputy Federal Marshal Charles Cotton, who had charge of Glover.   
On instructions from Judge Miller, Cotton ignored the writ.  Miller also informed 
the representatives of the protesters that a hearing on Glover’s status would be held 
on Monday morning at ten o’clock, and that “no power on earth could take Glover 
from his jurisdiction.”  Soon thereafter, one hundred men arrived on a steamboat 
from Racine and joined the crowd at the jail, which was addressed by Booth and 
other speakers, all of whom stressed the necessity of opposing the enforcement of the 
Fugitive Slave Law, but counseled the crowd against breaking the law.   
Booth and the remainder of the vigilance committee then left to take tea.  In their 
absence, the crowd demanded that the jailer surrender the keys.  When he refused, 
the crowd broke down the door with pickaxes and an improvised battering ram.  
They led Glover from the courthouse and, with Booth at his side, Glover was taken 
in a buggy to the underground railway station in Waukesha, from where he escaped 
to Canada. 
Soon after Glover escaped, Garland and the officials who had originally 
participated in the seizure of Joshua Glover were charged by the sheriff of Racine 
County with assault and battery, and Garland was jailed.  Judge Miller ordered 
Garland freed on a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that Garland “was aiding the 
marshal in the service of a warrant, at the [marshal’s] request.”49  Miller’s anger at 
the entire sequence of events was apparent from the language of his opinion, in 
which he declared that “I view this [arrest] warrant . . . to have been obtained by an 
officious intermeddler, for the same purpose as the habeas corpus—to effect the 
rescue of the fugitive Glover”50 and “I cannot but consider the imprisonment of 
[Garland], or of the marshal [who was also named in the warrant] a greater outrage 
than the rescue.”51 
United States District Attorney John R. Sharpstein then lodged criminal 
complaints against Booth and nine other leaders of the Glover rescue, alleging that 
they had violated the Fugitive Slave Act by aiding Glover in his escape from 
custody.  When Booth was brought for arraignment before Winfred Smith, a 
commissioner for the federal district court, bail was set at $2,000.  Booth initially 
posted bail through a surety; however, on May 26, at Booth’s own request, the surety 
delivered him to the federal authorities, and Booth was remanded to the county jail in 
Milwaukee. 
By returning to the custody of the commissioner, Booth placed himself in a 
position to challenge the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in state 
                                                                
49 Garland v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1318, 1319 (D.C. Wis.1854) (No. 15811). 
50Id. at 1319. 
51Id. 
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court.  On May 27, he successfully petitioned Justice Abram D. Smith of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  Fearing that ignoring the writ 
might provoke another confrontation with the citizenry of Milwaukee, Sharpstein 
chose instead to appear before Justice Smith and mount a defense at a hearing on 
May 29. 
At the hearing, Booth was represented by the abolitionist attorney Byron Paine.  
Paine first dismissed the claim that the state courts should not under any 
circumstances intervene to free a person who was in federal custody.  Paine relied 
heavily on the justification for nullification initially articulated in the 1790's by 
Thomas Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.  In his argument, Paine 
declared that “when the evil spirits of usurpation and oppression enter into and 
possess the Federal Power, the States may interpose with such powers as they have 
to arrest the progress of the evil.”52  Apparently seeking to distance himself from the 
position taken by South Carolina during the nullification crisis of the early 1830s, 
Paine also contended that “whatever objections might be urged against the actual 
exercise of the right of resistance by the legislative and executive departments of the 
State, cannot be urged with equal force against the actions of its Judiciary.”53  He 
concluded by asserting that “even if we have no judicial precedents in favor of the 
right of the States to protect their people against tyranny and usurpation, it is time 
such a precedent should be made.”54 
Turning to the merits, Paine relied on the standard anti-slavery critiques of the 
Fugitive Slave Act.  He argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to pass 
enforcement legislation, that the statute unconstitutionally delegated judicial 
authority to commissioners, and that the procedures mandated by the statute violated 
the Bill of Rights.  Paine also excoriated the Prigg Court, condemning what he 
described as “the violence they . . . perpetrate[d] on the established rules of 
construction”55 and that Story “labor[ed] to arrive at such a construction as shall best 
suit the convenience and accomplish the purpose of the slave-owners.”56   
Payne could not have found a more sympathetic ear for his arguments.  On June 
7, Justice Smith issued a lengthy opinion which concluded that Booth should be 
released from federal custody.57  Smith began his opinion by confronting the 
assertion that state courts lacked the authority to intervene in favor of a person who 
was in federal custody.  His response to this argument was two-fold.  First, he 
asserted that “every citizen has a right to call upon the state authority for protection” 
and that “it is the duty of the judicial officer, when applied to, to see that no citizen is 
imprisoned within the limits of the state . . . except by proper legal and constitutional 
authority.”58  In addition, Smith noted that, while he might have been reluctant to 
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release a prisoner from the custody of a federal judge, he had no such hesitation 
about asserting his authority over federal commissioners, whom Smith characterized 
as “subordinate and irresponsible functionaries, holding their office at the will of the 
federal courts.”59 
Turning to the merits of the habeas petition, Smith initially argued that the arrest 
warrant under which Booth was being held was fatally defective because it failed to 
allege that Garland had claimed Glover, and that Booth was entitled to be released 
for that reason alone.  Nonetheless, describing the state courts as “sentinel[s] to 
guard the outposts as well as the citadel[s] of the great principles and rights which 
[the Constitution] was intended to declare, secure and perpetuate”60  and proclaiming 
a duty “to interpose a resistance . . . to every assumption of power on the part of the 
general government, which is not expressly granted or necessarily implied in the 
federal constitution,”61  Smith also mounted a detailed assault on the constitutionality 
of the Fugitive Slave Act. 
The bulk of the opinion focused on the contention that Congress lacked authority 
to provide a mechanism for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause.  Smith 
began by decrying increases in federal power generally, declaring that “the last hope 
of free representative and federative government rests with the states.  Increase of 
influence and patronage on the part of the federal government naturally leads to 
consolidation, consolidation to despotism and ultimate anarchy, dissolution and all 
its attendant evils.”62  After reviewing the sparse discussions of the fugitive slave 
issue during the drafting and ratification process, he juxtaposed the Fugitive Slave 
Clause with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, with its explicit grant of power to 
Congress, concluding that there was not “one word of grant, or one word from which 
a grant [of power to legislate with respect to fugitive slaves] may be inferred or 
implied”63 and also that “from the known temper and scruples of the national 
convention, we may safely affirm, that had it been asked it would not have been 
granted, and had it been granted, no union could have been formed upon such a 
basis.”64 
Smith also concluded that the Fugitive Slave Act ran afoul of the procedural 
requirements outlined in the Bill of Rights.  He distinguished sharply between 
proceedings to extradite fugitives from justice and efforts to recover fugitive slaves, 
asserting that in the former, “[j]udicial proceedings have already been commenced, 
and [extradition] is but a species of process to bring the defendant into court,”65  
while the Fugitive Slave Clause “contemplates a judicial determination of the 
lawfulness of the claim which may be made.”66  The latter, he insisted, required the 
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full panoply of protections normally associated with due process of law, including a 
trial by jury. 
Smith conceded that his conclusions were inconsistent with the views expressed 
by the Supreme Court in Prigg and its progeny.  At this stage, however, he was not 
defying the Court’s authority.  Instead, Smith simply urged the Court to revisit its 
holding in Prigg in view of the antipathy toward the Fugitive Slave Act in the North 
and what Smith saw as the deficiencies of the reasoning in Justice Story’s opinion in 
Prigg itself.67 
Justice Smith’s decision was noted widely,68  and, not surprisingly, hailed as a 
great victory by abolitionists and more radical elements of the mainstream anti-
slavery movement.  The National Era, for example, expressed the hope that “this 
example of judicial independence and integrity [will be] followed in all the State 
Courts.”69  However, the legal battle in Wisconsin was still in its early stages.  
Sharpstein, acting on Ableman’s behalf, quickly petitioned the full Wisconsin 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the order to release Booth.  When 
the court agreed to hear the case, Sharpstein enlisted the services of Edward G. Ryan, 
a distinguished Wisconsin attorney, to represent the federal government. 
Ryan mounted a far more sophisticated defense of the federal government’s 
position than Sharpstein had originally presented before Justice Smith.  Nonetheless, 
on July 19,  in In re Sherman M. Booth (Booth I),70  the full court affirmed the order 
mandating Booth’s release.   Justice Smith delivered a long opinion reaffirming the 
views that he had expressed on June 7 in even more emphatic terms.71  Chief Justice 
Edward V. Whiton and Justice Samuel Crawford joined Smith in concluding that 
being held under the authority of a commissioner was not equivalent to being under 
the jurisdiction of a federal court, and that therefore the state courts could 
appropriately issue a writ of habeas corpus in Booth’s case.72  They also agreed that 
the warrant under which Booth was held was fatally defective.73  By contrast, the 
court was deeply divided on the question of the constitutionality of the Fugitive 
Slave Act. 
While agreeing with Smith that the statute was unconstitutional, Chief Justice 
Whiton emphasized different considerations.  Unlike Smith, who focused primarily 
on the argument that Congress lacked authority to pass any enforcement legislation, 
Whiton relied entirely on two other contentions:  that the statute unconstitutionally 
delegated federal judicial power to commissioners, and that it denied alleged 
fugitives what Whiton viewed as their constitutionally-protected right to a trial by 
jury.74  Whiton asserted that since the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 had not provided 
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68See, e.g., The Fugitive Slave Law Decided Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1854, 
at 1. 
69Decision of Judge Smith, NAT’L ERA, June 22, 1854, at 98. 
70In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854). 
71Id. at 87-144. 
72Id. at 53-56 (opinion of the Court); id. at 70-72 (Crawford, J., dissenting). 
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for the appointment of federal commissioners, the Prigg majority did not explicitly 
pass on the first point.  By contrast, Whiton conceded that the jury trial argument had 
been implicitly rejected when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1793 
statute in Prigg and Van Zandt.  At the same time, he observed that the specific issue 
before the Court in Prigg was the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Personal 
Liberty Law and declared that “it would be most unjust to [the Supreme] court to 
hold that it has decided questions which its judges have not even discussed, and 
which have not even been before it for adjudication.”75 
Crawford, on the other hand, would have rejected the constitutional challenge to 
the Fugitive Slave Act.  For constitutional purposes, he saw the reliance on 
commissioners in the 1850s as indistinguishable from the use of state officials that 
was challenged in Prigg.76 While observing that as an original matter he would have 
held that the states and the federal government possessed concurrent authority to 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause,77 he contended that the constitutional issues 
surrounding the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 had been “definitely settled” by Prigg 
and its progeny.78 
Despite Crawford’s dissent, the order freeing Booth from the custody of the 
commissioner was affirmed.  Not surprisingly, abolitionists were jubilant about the 
decision.  Predicting that the case would ultimately find its way to the United States 
Supreme Court, the New York Evangelist optimistically speculated that “[w]e have 
good reasons for expecting that if the decision of the Supreme Court can be 
procured, it will make a decided rent in this oppressive and cruel, if not wholly 
unconstitutional enactment.”79 The Boston Commonwealth was more cautious, but 
nonetheless upbeat.  On the one hand, the Commonwealth described the Supreme 
Court as “the agent of the slaveholding power, [which] must be expected to conform 
in its decisions to the will of that power.”  But the same newspaper hailed Booth I as 
the “decision of a highly respectable state court . . . evidence of a tendency towards a 
healthy state on this subject” and predicted that “before long the Northern courts 
generally will come to the same conclusion; and then, in the face of the mass of 
judicial opinion in the largest section of the country, the [fugitive slave law] cannot 
stand, but must be materially modified or repealed.”80 
It soon became clear, however, that the state court’s decision Booth I would be 
only a skirmish in the legal conflict set in motion by the escape of Joshua Glover.  
On September 11, noting that similar clashes between state and federal authorities 
had occurred in other states, United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing of 
Massachusetts wrote that he had decided that the decision should be appealed to the 
Supreme Court.81  After the papers were filed, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney 
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issued a writ of error to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the state court complied 
with the demands of the writ.82 
In the interim, it had become clear that, despite its doctrinal and symbolic 
importance, the decision in Booth I had not materially changed the legal situation 
faced by Booth.  On Saturday, July 8, even before the Wisconsin Supreme Court had 
rendered its decision, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Booth for 
aiding and abetting the escape of Joshua Glover.  The grand jury also indicted John 
Ryecraft and John Messenger for their roles in the affair.  On July 10, Judge Miller 
himself issued arrest warrants based on the indictments.  Booth was promptly 
rearrested on the basis of these warrants. 
Now represented by James H. Paine, the father of Byron Paine, Booth once again 
petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  However, in 
Ex parte Sherman M. Booth (Booth II),83 the state supreme court unanimously 
declined to issue the writ.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Abram Smith explained 
the difference between the two cases, observing that “in [Booth I, Booth] was held 
under the process of an officer who had no power to hear and determine upon the 
validity of the law, or the allegations of the defendant against its validity.  But now 
he is held under process of . . . a judicial tribunal, having full power and authority to 
decide upon all the questions and allegations presented in his behalf.”84  Under those 
circumstances, the court reasoned, considerations of comity required that the action 
in the federal court be allowed to proceed to its conclusion without interference from 
the state court. 
Southerners and their allies were greatly relieved by the decision in Booth II. A 
correspondent of the Washington Union, the official organ of the administration of 
President Franklin Pierce, praised the Wisconsin Supreme Court for recognizing the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to deal with cases arising under the 
Fugitive Slave Law.85  Not surprisingly, those who had supported the decision in 
Booth I took a quite different view.  On July 15, the Milwaukee News complained 
that “[i]t was easy to sit on the bench and solemnly decide the [Fugitive Slave Act 
was] unconstitutional and void . . . . But, when . . . Booth applies for the practical 
fruits of this solemn adjudication in his favor, the two Judges are seized with a 
solemn spasm of ‘comity.’  Although the law is wholly ‘void,’ they can’t venture to 
grant a writ of habeas corpus! the unhappy victim must lie in prison as an act of 
courtesy!”86 
Because Booth was ill, Ryecraft was tried alone in November, 1854.  Edward 
Ryan once again represented the federal government.  Defending Ryecraft, attorneys 
George Lakin and Michael Steever appealed to the higher law doctrine, and also 
insisted that the burden was on the prosecution to plead and prove that Glover had in 
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fact been a slave.87  In addition, like the defense in the Morris case in 1851, Lakin 
and Steever contended that the jury had the right to determine the law as well as the 
facts.88 
Judge Miller’s charge to the jury on November 18 rejected these contentions and 
also left no doubt regarding his views about Ryecraft’s guilt and the actions of those 
who had broken into the jail and freed Glover more generally.89  Miller began by 
defending not only the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act but also the policy 
underlying the law, asserting that it was “effective in carrying out the provisions of 
the constitution [and] is equally so in protecting free colored persons from secret or 
criminal deportation.”90  He evinced nothing but disdain for the appeal to the higher 
law, declaring “[i]f a man willfully violates the laws of his country by the 
commission of an offence against those laws, he comes with a poor grace before a 
jury of honest men, sworn to render a true verdict according to evidence, with a plea 
of ‘higher law’ or ‘rights of conscience.’”91  Miller also brushed aside the assertion 
that the members of the jury could act on their own independent interpretation of the 
law, stating simply that “[u]nder the judicial system of the United States, [the 
members of the jury] take the law from the court in all cases both civil and criminal, 
whether it comports with their individual opinions or not.”92 
Turning to the facts of the case, Miller stated flatly that the testimony 
demonstrated that Ryecraft had been a member of the vigilance committee93 and that 
he was “at the jail, working and assisting to break the door of the jail-yard and the 
door of the jail.”94 Miller also decried the actions of the members of the committee in 
inciting the crowd by describing Garland and the deputy marshals as “kidnappers.” 
He noted the following: 
If I had ordered the marshal to bring up Glover for hearing, at that time, it 
certainly could not have been done.  Under the cry of kidnapper the rescue 
would have been effected by that excited crowd, and the personal safety 
of the officer periled.  An offer to the judge of protection would be of little 
avail, after a mob was got up by the cry of rescue, and inflamed by that of 
kidnapper . . . . This committee was probably the primary cause of that 
outrage, and if so, each member of it is responsible for the escape.95 
Against the background of this charge, the jury convicted Ryecraft on November 
19. 
Despite Ryecraft’s conviction, the assertion that the prosecution was required to 
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plead and prove the fact that Glover was a slave in an action under the Fugitive Slave 
Act created some uneasiness among the representatives of the federal government.  
Accordingly, in early January 1855, prior to bringing Booth to trial, prosecutors 
voluntarily dismissed the indictment against Booth and reindicted him, this time 
adding a count charging him with obstructing, resisting and opposing the execution 
of federal process more generally.  Booth struck back by filing complaints for false 
imprisonment in state court against both Miller and Sharpstein, forcing them to post 
bail in order to avoid being taken into custody.96 
The trial of Booth himself took place in a crowded Milwaukee courtroom from 
January 10 through January 13, 1855.  Despite Miller’s earlier ruling that issues of 
law were matters for the judge rather than the jury, Paine appealed openly to the 
concept of jury nullification in his summation.  Analogizing the Glover escape to the 
rescue of Peter from Herod’s prison by an angel, Paine identified the slave power as 
Herod and asserted that “[m]en are now indicted . . . for imitating Angels of God”97 
and also proclaimed that “I charge upon this prosecution that they have come into 
court before you and confessed that they are engaged in the execution of an infamous 
law.”98 
Miller, however, was having none of it.  He charged the jurors that they would be 
committing “moral perjury” if they disregarded his instructions on the law, and also 
reiterated his view that the government was not required to prove that Glover had in 
fact been a slave.99  Based on this charge, the jury convicted Booth after only eight 
hours of deliberations.  Booth was not, however, found guilty on all counts of the 
indictment; instead, the jury concluded only that he was guilty of aiding and abetting 
the escape of Joshua Glover from the custody of the deputy marshals.  The jurors 
also appended a statement declaring that the following:  
Resolved, That while we feel ourselves bound by a solemn oath to 
perform a most painful duty, in declaring the defendant guilty of the 
above charge, and thus making him liable to the penalties of a most cruel 
and odious law, yet, at the same time, in so doing we declare that he 
performed a most noble, benevolent and humane act, and we thus record 
our condemnation of the Fugitive Slave law, and earnestly commend him 
to the clemency of the Court.100   
Based on the verdict, after denying defense motions for a new trial, on January 
23, Miller sentenced Booth to thirty days imprisonment in the county jail and a fine 
of $1,000, and Ryecraft to a term of ten days in jail and a fine of $200. 
Assessments of the verdict against Booth and Ryecraft differed widely.  Some 
saw the decision as a victory for the principle of the rule of law.  For example, the 
Milwaukee News declared that: 
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[w]e rejoice at this verdict, not because this defendant is made to suffer, 
but because it is calculated to teach men a fact which they have been too 
prone to forget, that we live under a government of law, that our 
institutions of freedom rest upon the observance of law, that the rampant 
spirit of mob law shall not be tolerated with impunity in the free State of 
Wisconsin, that the doctrine of a higher law to justify the disregard of the 
allegiance which every citizen owes to his country, is a false doctrine, and 
that he who attempts to put it into practical operation is taking a straight 
road and a short one to the penitentiary.101 
Not surprisingly, anti-slavery activists had a quite different view, characterizing 
Booth in particular as a martyr to the cause who was being punished unjustly.  On 
February 1, the New York Independent proposed that its readers each contribute one 
dollar to a fund that would pay Booth’s fine.102  Contributors to the fund included a 
number of prominent anti-slavery members of Congress.103  
Subsequent events soon raised the profile of the case still further.  Seeking to 
have their clients freed from custody, on January 26, the attorneys for Booth and 
Ryecraft once again petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for writs of habeas 
corpus.  The following day, the court granted the petition, and the writs were served 
on both Ableman and Samuel Conover, the sheriff of the county jail where the two 
convicted activists were being held.  While specifically declining to acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the court, Ableman replied that he could not produce Booth and 
Ryecraft because they were now in the custody of the county sheriff.  Conover, on 
the other hand, agreed to bring the prisoners to appear before the court in Madison, 
Wisconsin.104  On January 30, a crowd of 2,000 supporters marched with Booth and 
Ryecraft as they were being taken to the Milwaukee train station for their trip to 
Madison.105 
The hearing on the petition to free the prisoners was set for February 2.   
Sharpstein was notified, but did not appear, apparently unwilling to recognize the 
authority of the Wisconsin court to issue the writ.106  After hearing arguments from 
the attorneys for the prisoners, in In re Booth and Rycraft [sic] (Booth III), 107 the 
three justices of the state supreme court concluded unanimously that both prisoners 
should be freed. 
The opinions of Chief Justice Whiton and Justice Smith were largely devoted to 
defenses of the general proposition that the state courts possessed the power to 
interpose their authority to free prisoners held in federal custody.  Whiton 
proclaimed that “[w]ithout this power, the state would be stripped of one of the most 
essential attributes of sovereignty, and would present the spectacle of a state 
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proclaiming the allegiance of its citizens, without the power to protect them in the 
enjoyment of their personal liberty upon its own soil.”108 Simlarly, Smith declared 
that “[t]he power to guard and protect the liberty of the individual citizen is inherent 
in every government; one which it cannot relinquish, which was reserved to the 
states [and] without which they could not exist, because it is obvious that they could 
claim no allegiance or support from their citizens whom they had not the power to 
protect.”109 
It fell to Justice Crawford to provide the justification for the decision to free 
Booth and Ryecraft under the specific circumstances of Booth III.  Crawford, who 
had voted to sustain the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act in Booth I, was 
careful to limit the scope of his analysis in Booth III.  He first emphasized that the 
state court could intervene only in a case in which the federal court lacked 
jurisdiction, noting that “if it had such jurisdiction, it matters not how illegal, unjust 
or arbitrary the proceedings in that court may have been, nor how many errors may 
have been committed upon the trial; if the court had jurisdiction . . . it is by no means 
my duty as a judicial officer of this state, to revise the decision or correct the 
errors.”110   Second, he emphasized that, rather than being common law courts of 
general jurisdiction, the federal courts had only the “special and limited” jurisdiction 
established by statute, and thus that “the facts necessary to give them jurisdiction 
must appear affirmatively on the face of their proceedings, and cannot be 
presumed.”111 
Crawford conceded that some of the counts of the indictments had alleged facts 
sufficient to provide the court with jurisdiction to determine if Booth and Ryecraft 
had violated the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.112 However, they had not been 
convicted under these counts.  Instead, their confinement rested solely on the counts 
of the indictments that charged that they had assisted Joshua Glover in escaping from 
federal custody, but did not specify that allege that Glover had owed service and 
labor to Garland.  Crawford contended that the statute required such allegations and 
that the relevant portions of the indictment had therefore not charged the two 
defendants with a federal crime.  Analogizing Booth III to a case in which the federal 
court had lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Crawford reasoned that 
only such a charge could vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to try the cases, and 
that therefore the Wisconsin Supreme Court could free Booth and Ryecraft in a 
habeas corpus proceeding.113  
Crawford was able to characterize his opinion as limited in scope only by 
conflating the jurisdictional inquiry with an examination of the merits.  The 
gravamen of a jurisdictional objection is the claim that the court lacks power to 
adjudicate the legal issues that have been brought before it.  Yet Crawford did not 
assert that the federal district court had no authority to determine whether the 
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indictment sufficiently alleged a violation of the Fugitive Slave Law.  Instead, he 
simply concluded that the district court had interpreted the statute incorrectly by not 
requiring that Glover’s status be pleaded and proven—a quintessential issue of the 
merits. 
Moreover, Crawford’s approach was flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ex Parte Watkins.114  There, in holding that the Court would not entertain 
a collateral attack on a criminal judgment from a District of Columbia court, Chief 
Justice John Marshall had asserted that “[i]t is universally understood that the 
judgments of the courts of the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown 
in the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world; and that this apparent want of 
jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error...The judgment of [a federal] 
court in a criminal-case is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for its 
support no inspection of the indictments on which it is founded.”115   
Not surprisingly, analysis of these legal niceties found little place in the 
commentary that followed Booth III.  The New York Journal of Commerce, closely 
allied with the Democratic party, described the decision as an “utter subversion of 
the powers of the Federal Judiciary,”116 and Judge Miller himself warned that “some 
state or county judge or state court commissioner may follow this precedent, and 
upon some vague notion of the unconstitutionality of acts of Congress, or of error in 
the proceedings in this court . . . discharge all the United States convicts and 
prisoners from the prisons and jails of the State.”117  By contrast, the staunchly anti-
slavery New York Tribune declared that “[t]he Judges of [Wisconsin] have won a 
lasting title to regard and admiration by their late decision in [Booth III] . . . . The 
example which Wisconsin has set will be as rapidly followed as circumstances admit 
. . . we anticipate a race among the other Free States in the same direction, till all 
have reached the goal of State independence.”118 
Against this background, federal government officials considered their options.  
Since Ryecraft had already been confined in the county jail for ten days, Booth III 
had no practical impact on his situation.  By contrast, Booth had not yet served the 
full thirty day sentence that had been imposed by Judge Miller.  In theory, the federal 
marshals could have made an effort to rearrest Booth immediately.  But this course 
of action would quite likely have engendered violent resistance, and in any event the 
federal authorities would have had to find some alternative venue in which to 
incarcerate him.  Thus, the Pierce administration chose instead to appeal Booth III to 
the United States Supreme Court.119 
The effort to prosecute the appeal met resistance from the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, whose attitude had hardened considerably since the appeal of Booth I the year 
before.  When the Supreme Court sent its writ of error to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, the state court judges instructed their clerk to ignore the writ and not to record 
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it in the official records of the court.120  This action was far more extreme than the 
actual decision in Booth III itself.121  By refusing to honor the writ of error, the 
Wisconsin court essentially asserted the authority to nullify section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1793, which provided for appeals by writ of error.  The refusal also 
implicitly challenged the premises of the Supreme Court’s famous 1816 decision in 
Martin v.  Hunter’s Lessee,122 which had established the Court’s authority to hear and 
definitively resolve appeals from state courts.  Nonetheless, the Wisconsin courts 
continued to receive support and encouragement from at least some elements of the 
national anti-slavery movement.  For example, the Chicago Tribune declared that 
“[w]e owe to the Supreme court of Wisconsin the respect and reverence due to a 
judicial tribunal which has had the courage to avow, and will have the virtue to 
maintain, the fundamental principles of State Rights and Personal Liberty.”123  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s maneuver ultimately failed in its intended effect 
because the Pierce administration had anticipated the ploy and acted in advance to 
counteract it.  Prior to the issuance of the writ of error Sharpstein, following 
instructions from Washington, had approached the clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court and requested an authenticated copy of the record in Booth III.  Sharpstein did 
not disclose the motivation for his request, and the clerk complied.124  After the state 
court refused to honor the mandate of the writ of error, Attorney General Cushing 
petitioned the Court to act on the copy of the record that Sharpstein had obtained. 
Cushing’s motion provided the Southern justices and their allies with a clear 
opportunity to strike a rhetorical blow at those who opposed the enforcement of the 
Fugitive Slave Law.  Taney and his allies could have proceeded based on the copy of 
the record that had been obtained by Sharpstein and justified their action with an 
opinion that branded Booth and the members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as 
lawless nullifiers who were prepared to defy even the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  Instead, the justices proceeded more cautiously.   
Speaking for a unanimous Court in May, 1856, Taney did note that the refusal of 
the clerk to comply with the writ of error could not prevent the exercise of the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.125  However, he also concluded that “in a matter of so 
much gravity and importance,” the Court should not proceed to the merits without 
first giving the clerk another opportunity to provide an official copy of the record of 
the lower court proceedings.126  Accordingly, the Court issued an order directly to the 
clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, mandating that he provide a copy of the state 
court record.  In a companion opinion, the Court also postponed consideration of the 
appeal in the Booth I so that the two cases could be considered together.127  As a 
result, the Court would not consider the merits of either case during its 1856 term.  
                                                                
120Id. at 18. 
121Id. 
12214 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
123More Southern Vaporing, LIBERATOR (Boston), November 23, 1855. 
124Beitzinger, supra note 48, at 18. 
125In re United States v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 476, 478 (1855). 
126Id. 
127Ableman v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 479, 479 (1855). 
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The decision of the Southern-dominated Court to proceed cautiously in early 
1856 may well have been influenced by the uncertainty of the political situation, 
particularly in the North.  At the time that the Court postponed the decision in Booth, 
the emergence of the Republican party as the primary opposition party in the North 
was far from certain.  The performance of self-identified Republicans in the state and 
local elections of 1855 had been uneven at best, and the future of the party seemed 
heavily dependent on the course of events in Kansas.  While Congress continued to 
wrangle over the future of the territory, the winter of 1855-56 failed to produce the 
kind of dramatic events that would further galvanize the anti-slavery faithful and 
convince wavering Northerners to put aside their previous political differences and 
join together in a crusade against the influence of the slave power.  If anti-slavery 
sentiment could be subsumed in some reconstitution of Whiggery or a Northern 
party devoted to nativism, temperance or some other political issue, the possibility of 
a renewed accommodation between the sections no doubt seemed very real to some 
contemporary observers.128  Against this background, the decision to postpone  the 
reckoning in Booth may well have been influenced by a desire to avoid roiling the 
political waters unduly. 
In any event, the arguments in Ableman v. Booth129 were not heard until January 
19, 1859, after sectional tensions had been further exacerbated by events such as the 
caning of Charles Sumner,130 the decision in Dred Scott and the conflict over the 
Lecompton constitution.131  The United States was represented by Jeremiah S. Black, 
who served as Attorney General during the Buchanan administration.  By contrast, 
although the Court was provided with a written copy of Byron Paine’s argument 
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, no counsel appeared on behalf of either Booth 
or the state of Wisconsin. 
Black was a particularly apt choice to make the case against the intervention of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Four years earlier, while serving on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, he had delivered a strongly worded opinion refusing to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus on the petition of Passmore Williamson, who had been imprisoned 
by a federal court after having been alleged to have unlawfully aided in the escape of 
a slave.132  Although the full text of his argument in Ableman was never published, 
Black was reported to have denounced the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in the strongest terms, darkly suggesting that the state judges could be cited for 
contempt but “magnanimously” indicating that the government would not pursue 
such a course.133  
                                                                
128See GIENAPP, supra note 47, at 273. 
12962 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
130The impact of the Sumner caning is described in GIENAPP, supra note 47, at 299-302; 
POTTER, supra note 42, at 209-11; WILENTZ, supra note 47, at 690-92. 
131For discussions of the dispute over the Lecompton constitution, see, e.g., DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 
458-84 (1978); MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST: THE ECLIPSE OF 
MANIFEST DESTINY AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 196-201 (1997); POTTER, supra note 
42, at 302-25. 
132In re Williamson’s Case, 3 Am. Law Reg. 741, 1855 WL 7059, at *6, *14 (Pa. 1855).  
133SWISHER, supra note 24, at 662. 
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With the Court dominated by Southerners and Northern Democrats, the outcome 
of the case was never really in doubt.  In the abstract, Justice Peter V. Daniel of 
Virginia might have found the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s perspective on federalism 
attractive.134  However, given his strong pro-slavery and anti-Northern views, Daniel 
was hardly likely to countenance state interference in a prosecution under the 
Fugitive Slave Act.  Conversely, despite the fact that Justice John McLean was 
strongly opposed to the expansion of slavery and had been a major contender for the 
Republican presidential nomination in 1856, he had consistently resisted efforts to 
undermine the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.135  Indeed, as recently as 1855, 
in Ex Parte Robinson,136 McLean had incurred the wrath of more radical elements of 
the anti-slavery movement by ordering the release of a federal marshal who had been 
jailed by Ohio officials for rearresting fugitive slaves whom the state courts had 
ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, in marked contrast to Dred Scott, 
Taney was able to rally a unanimous Court behind an opinion reversing the 
judgments of the Wisconsin court.137 
Taney began by assailing the basic premises underlying both Booth I and Booth 
III.  Observing that “the paramount power of the State court lies at the foundation of 
[both] decisions,”138 he contended: 
It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the result to 
which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of 
itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer; for no one will suppose that a 
Government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws 
by its own tribunals, and preserving the union of the States, could have 
lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offences 
against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the 
State in which the culprit was found.139  
Taney then turned specifically to the claim that the Wisconsin court possessed 
the authority to free Booth from federal custody.  On this point, he asserted: 
[T]he powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both 
exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate 
and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and indepently [sic] of each 
other, within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action 
appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial 
process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division 
was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State 
of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its 
                                                                
134Daniel’s life and philosophy are described in detail in JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL 
DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL, 1784-1860 (1964); see also EARL M. MALTZ, 
DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 78-83 (2007). 
135See MALTZ, supra note 134, at 95-97 (describing McLean’s perspective). 
1363 Ohio Dec. Reprint 51 (Prob. Ct. 1858).  
137Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1859). 
138Ableman, 62 U.S. at 514. 
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judges and courts, than it would have had if the prisoner had been 
confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an offence 
against the laws of the State in which he was imprisoned.140 
Taney conceded that the state courts had authority to issue writs of habeas corpus 
in order to inquire into the reasons that a person was being held in custody and that 
the responsible federal officials should provide an explanation in writing.  But Taney 
also asserted:  
[A]fter the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprized 
[sic] that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, 
they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within 
the dominion and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the 
writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State authority, 
can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties.141 
Any errors in the federal proceeding—including jurisdictional errors—could be 
corrected only on appeal.  Moreover, Taney declared that it was the duty of federal 
officials to resist—by force if necessary—any effort to remove a prisoner from their 
custody to bring the prisoner before a state court in a habeas proceeding.142 
Taney’s critique of the state court’s decision to free Booth from custody did not 
rest on a theory of federal supremacy.  Instead, the critique was based on what might 
be described as a theory of concurrent sovereignty—the view that the state and 
federal governments should be viewed as coequal sovereigns, and that, under 
principles of comity, each should respect the judicial proceedings of the other.  The 
same theory would suggest that the federal courts should also generally refrain from 
interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings, even in the face of allegations 
that the proceedings somehow implicated federal rights. 
By contrast, Taney’s response to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s failure to 
comply with the writ of error emphasized the place of the United States Supreme 
Court in the judicial hierarchy.  After noting that the Constitution’s grant of appellate 
jurisdiction by its terms applied to cases from all courts–not simply federal courts143–
he argued that: 
it is manifest that [the establishment of] ultimate appellate power in a 
tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure 
the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere 
of action assigned to it; to make the Constitution and laws of the United 
States uniform, and the same in every State; and to guard against evils 
which would inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts 
of a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter 
authorized to decide between them.144 
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Taney also observed  that, when the Constitution was drafted in 1787, “it was 
manifest that serious controversies would arise between the authorities of the United 
States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms, unless some tribunal 
was created to decide between them finally and without appeal.”145  Finally, after 
stating flatly that the Fugitive Slave Act was constitutional and that the actions of the 
commissioner in taking Booth into custody were entirely lawful, Taney averred that 
“if any argument was needed to show the wisdom and necessity of this appellate 
power, the cases before us sufficiently prove it, and at the same time emphatically 
call for its exercise.”146 
Taney also denied that recognizing the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court 
in any way denigrated the sovereignty of the states.  He first observed that:  
[n]either this Government, nor the powers of which we are speaking, were 
forced upon the States. The Constitution of the United States, with all the 
powers conferred by it on the General Government, and surrendered by 
the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States, 
deliberately done, for their own protection and safety against injustice 
from one another.147 
He then argued that:  
the highest honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith. And certainly no 
faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which 
every State has plighted to the other States to support the Constitution as it 
is, in all its provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the 
Constitution itself prescribes.148 
He further stated that:  
no power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and 
finally, all cases arising under such Constitution and laws; and for that 
purpose to bring here for revision, by writ of error, the judgment of a State 
court, where such questions have arisen, and the right claimed under them 
denied by the highest judicial tribunal in the State.149 
Despite its powerful reassertion of the Supreme Court’s authority over state 
courts, Ableman should not be read as an endorsement of a strong vision of federal 
power more generally.  Indeed, observing that the Court also had the power to 
invalidate federal statutes, Taney explicitly noted that “[the] judicial power was 
justly regarded as indispensable, not merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of 
the United States, but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their 
reserved rights by the General Government.”150  Thus, although the Supreme Court 
                                                                
145Id. at 519-20. 
146Id. at 526. 
147Id. at 524. 
148Id. at 525. 
149Id. 
150Id. at 520. 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
106 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:83 
 
was clearly a department of the federal government that derived its power solely 
from the federal Constitution, Taney conceptualized the Court as a neutral arbiter 
that was well positioned to mediate conflicts between the state governments and the 
other branches of the federal government.  It was this function that he viewed as 
having been compromised by the actions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the 
Booth cases. 
Legal scholars have generally heaped lavish praise on Taney’s performance in 
Ableman.  For example, Charles Warren characterizes Ableman as “the most 
powerful of all [of Taney’s] notable opinions,”151 while Carl B. Swisher asserts that 
the opinion “marked the Chief Justice at his best”152 and was “thoughtful, measured, 
and disciplined to the last degree.”153    
By contrast, contemporary responses to the decision were far less uniform.  Not 
surprisingly, Southerners and Northern Democrats unanimously supported Taney.  
Describing the actions of the government of Wisconsin as “totally illegal and 
virtually revolutionary,” the Cleveland National Democrat stated, “[W]e trust that 
[Ableman] will be read with careful, and in the case of men willing to violate the law 
with prayerful attention, for the sound law and truthful doctrines it teaches.”154  
Similarly, The States of Washington, D.C. declared that, while Taney had “lived long 
and done much for honor and fame,” Ableman was “the summit.  He will never 
surpass the wisdom and value of [that] opinion.”155 Republicans, on the other hand, 
were split.  While the Philadelphia North American averred that “[t]he conduct of 
the Wisconsin Court was such as to preclude any other decree,”156  the New York 
Evening Post complained that “[n]othing more fatal to the reserved rights of the 
States, nothing more dangerous to the securities of the individual, can well be 
conceived, than the authority claimed for [the federal courts] in the recent decision of 
Judge Taney.”157    Predictably, some of the strongest reaction came from the state of 
Wisconsin itself.  On March 19, the state legislature adopted a resolution 
characterizing the decision in Ableman as “an act of undelegated power, and 
therefore without authority void and of no force” and declaring that the states “being 
sovereign and independent have the unquestionable right to judge [the 
Constitution’s] infraction; and that a positive defiance of those sovereignties, of all 
unauthorized acts done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument, is the 
rightful remedy.”158 Attempts to enforce the Court’s judgment would meet with 
much the same defiant attitude. 
                                                                
1512 WARREN, supra note 25, at 336. 
152SWISHER, supra note 24, at 662. 
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The first step in the process was to file the mandate of the Ableman Court with 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Jeremiah Black’s efforts to obtain a copy of the 
opinion and mandates from the Court for this purpose provoked a mini-controversy.  
When Black requested such a copy from the Clerk’s office on April 26, he was at 
first informed that Taney had directed that no copies be given out until the opinion 
was officially published.159  Black responded by sending a written protest to the 
Clerk demanding the document “[i]n the name and by the direction of the President 
and for the public use in a matter of great and pressing importance” and declaring 
that “[r]egarding this as a public record I respectfully suggest that I have a legal right 
to have it for the purpose referred to.”160 The matter was referred to Taney, who 
authorized the release of the opinion to Black on condition that it be used for official 
purposes only.161 
Black then sent a copy of the mandates to Don A. J. Upham,162 who had 
succeeded John R. Sharpstein as district attorney in Wisconsin.163  On September 22, 
Upham moved to have the state supreme court file the mandates.164   The makeup of 
the Wisconsin court was entirely different from that which had decided the original 
Booth cases.  In the election of 1855, Orestes Cole had unseated Samuel Crawford–
the lone dissenter in Booth I165 who had written the majority opinion in Booth III.166  
In the spring of 1859, Chief Justice Edward Whiton died, and Republican Governor 
Alexander Randall chose Luther S. Dixon to replace him.  Finally, in the elections of 
1859, the voters chose Byron Paine, who had represented Booth,167 to replace Abram 
Smith, who had declined to seek reelection. Thus constituted, the court declined to 
grant Upham’s motion.168 Only Dixon voted to file the mandate, defending his 
position in a long opinion.169  Cole voted not to file the mandate, while Paine recused 
himself.170 
The significance of this action was largely symbolic; in practical terms, the 
critical issue was whether Booth would be rearrested and forced to serve the 
remainder of the sentence that had been imposed on him by the federal court.  
Upham was leery of provoking renewed unrest and the possibility of provoking a 
new confrontation with the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Thus, it was not until March 
1, 1860 that Booth was rearrested on Judge Miller’s orders and confined in the 
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federal customs house in Milwaukee.171  Now represented by Carl Schurz, a young 
Republican activist, Booth once again petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus,172 raising the specter of another potential clash between state 
and federal authorities. 
Ironically, such a crisis was averted in part because Byron Paine had been elected 
to the state court.173  With Paine forced to disqualify himself because of his prior 
involvement with the case, the Wisconsin court once again split evenly, with Cole 
supporting Booth and Dixon voting to deny the petition.174  As a result, the court 
took no action on Booth’s behalf.175 
By March 21, Booth had served the full term of imprisonment to which he had 
been sentenced.176  Nonetheless, he remained confined in the customs house because 
he adamantly refused to either pay the fine which had been imposed or to allow his 
supporters to pay the fine for him.177  Seeking to use his imprisonment as a focal 
point for continued agitation against the Fugitive Slave Act, Booth penned a series of 
widely published letters that bitterly protested both the fact of his imprisonment and 
the conditions under which he was being held.178  Adding to the outcry, the 
Wisconsin Free Democrat complained that “[Booth] is kept in prison now solely 
because the State has failed to vindicate its authority and honor, and redeem the 
pledges it has made to protect his liberty” and that “every hour he remains in prison, 
while no steps are taken for his release, is a reproach to the Republican party of 
Wisconsin.”179 
Spurred on by such appeals, a group of armed men forcibly removed Booth from 
Federal custody on August 1.180   Booth did not go into hiding; instead, he continued 
to address anti-slavery gatherings, at times brandishing a pistol that he referred to as 
his “little habeas corpus.”181 After a number of efforts by federal officials to 
recapture Booth were thwarted by crowds of armed men,182 he was finally taken back 
into custody on October 8, and remained confined in the customs house until, over 
the bitter objections of Jeremiah Black, Booth was granted a pardon by President 
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Buchanan on the day before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.183 
IV.  EPILOGUE:  ARNOLD V. BOOTH 
The pardon did not end the legal saga of Sherman Booth.  In 1854, Benammi 
Garland had instituted a civil suit against Booth for damages under the Fugitive 
Slave Act.184  The suit first came to trial before Judge Miller in April, 1855, but the 
jury could not agree on a verdict and was dismissed on April 23.185  A new jury was 
impaneled on July 5.186  After hearing arguments for two days, the jury was charged 
by Miller in terms that essentially directed them to return a verdict for the plaintiff.187  
On August 6, Miller entered a judgment against Booth for $1000 plus costs.188 
On February 24, 1857, acting on this judgment, the United States marshal seized 
a printing press and a portable steam engine belonging to Booth.189  This property 
was then sold to Jonathan Arnold, and the proceeds delivered to Garland in order to 
satisfy the judgment.190  Booth then brought suit in the state court, seeking to recover 
the property.191  Apparently relying on the state supreme court’s decision in Booth 
III, the trial court ruled in Booth’s favor, concluding that the judgment could not 
legally be enforced because the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional and the 
federal district thus had had no jurisdiction over Garland’s original suit.192 
When the decision was appealed to the state supreme court, Booth was once 
again represented by James H. Paine, who relied heavily on the reasoning of Booth 
III in his argument.193  However, in Arnold v. Booth, Orasmus Cole joined Luther 
Dixon in holding that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.194  
Speaking for the court, Cole observed that, even without the Fugitive Slave Act, the 
federal district court had jurisdiction over Garland’s initial action by virtue of 
diversity of citizenship.195  Thus, Cole concluded that, unlike the earlier Booth cases, 
the action to recover the property was nothing more than a collateral attack on the 
merits of judgment of the federal district court which should not have been 
entertained in the state court.196 
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The argument on which Cole relied in Arnold was doctrinally unexceptionable.  
However, the decision to distinguish Booth III was also no doubt influenced by the 
dramatically different political contexts of the two cases.  In the middle and late 
1850s, when the travails of Sherman Booth had previously been before the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Republicans had viewed the aggrandizement of state 
power as their best defense against a federal government that that they saw as 
dominated by pro-slavery interests.  By contrast, in the summer of 1861, Republican 
Abraham Lincoln held the presidency and was by slave state governments that 
defended the right to secede by relying on the same theory of state sovereignty that 
had animated the Wisconsin courts in their previous Booth decisions.  With secession 
now the primary issue facing the country, to have had a state supreme court 
dominated by Republicans rely on similar principles in Arnold would have been 
awkward at best.  
V.  CONCLUSION  
The long-running clash over the fate of Sherman Booth illustrates the central 
reality of the sectional conflict in the late antebellum era.  As Carl Schurz would 
later recall that, in the late 1850s, “in the North, as well as in the South, men’s 
sympathies with regard to slavery shaped and changed their political doctrines and 
their constitutional theories.”197  Thus, in Dred Scott, the Southern justices adopted 
the state-centered common property doctrine in order to argue that slavery must be 
allowed in the territories.198  But in the dispute over fugitive slaves, it was the anti-
slavery forces that exalted the power of the states in the federal union.  The actions 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ableman reflect the lengths to which some 
Republicans were willing to go in resisting the power of the federal government in 
this context. 
Of course, the decision of the Southern states to secede after the election of 
Lincoln dramatically changed this dynamic.  With Lincoln determined to hold the 
Union together, the Republican party became known as the party of nationalism.  But 
this transformation was almost a historical accident; it did not reflect the basic 
ideology of either the party itself, or the anti-slavery movement more generally.199 
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